The impact of political connections on cost of funding and bank performance of foreign exchange national bank
(1) Universitas Hayam Wuruk Perbanas
(2) Universitas Hayam Wuruk Perbanas
(3) Universitas Hayam Wuruk Perbanas
(*) Corresponding Author
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.24123/jmb.v21i1.568
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. ISSN: 1412-3789. e-ISSN: 2477-1783.
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